This paper studies a largely overlooked and important market in explaining the recent financial crisis-the condominium loan market, which constitutes 15% of the overall residential mortgage market. Condo loans have distinct characteristics that make the market a natural setting to understand the roles of less financially constrained homebuyers and investors in contributing to the recent financial crisis. Condominium loans appear to be safer by conventional risk metrics, but they are more likely to be associated with investment purchases; their loan terms are much riskier; and condo borrowers tend to exercise the default option more ruthlessly compared to conventional prime or subprime borrowers. Compared with the subprime market, condominium loan defaults increased at a faster pace over the 2003-2009 period; among loans originated in 2006 or 2007, condominium loans are 30% more likely to default within two years of origination. Condo loans default much earlier, and these early defaults, especially by investors in the non-subprime sector, predict future defaults in the single-family subprime market in the same location.
Introduction
This study is the first to document the unique risk pattern and borrower behavior in the U.S. condominium loan market in the early 2000s, which may have helped precipitate the recent financial crisis. Using privately securitized condominium (condo) loans, we find that condo loan 1 Compared with single-family loans, condominium loans have lower interest rates and are much less likely to be subprime loans, but they are far more likely to have unconventional and riskier loan terms, such as interest-only mortgages or mortgages requiring low or no documentation. Condo loan borrowers have significantly higher FICO credit scores than single-family loan borrowers and they are more likely to be investors.
[Insert Figure 1 about Here]
In addition to its significant size, the condo loan market has distinct characteristics that carry implications for the current debate on the factors contributing to the financial crisis. Much of the existing literature focuses on the role of innovation in mortgage products (e.g., subprime mortgages) 2 or on the role of securitization and the associated agency problems. 3 Other recent research (Haughwout, Lee, Tracy, and van der Klaauw, 2011; Case, Shiller and Thompson, 2012) suggests that a less studied but potentially more fundamental factor may have triggered the crisis-homebuyer and especially investor expectations. Based on a survey sample in four U.S.
cities, Case et al. (2012) report that home price expectations, which reached abnormal levels relative to the mortgage rate at the peak of the boom and have declined sharply since, were highly correlated to the price movements of the housing market. Haughwout et al. (2011) hypothesize that real estate "investors"-borrowers who use financial leverage in the form of mortgage credit to purchase multiple residential properties-played a previously unrecognized but important role in fueling the housing boom and exacerbating the housing bust. Specifically, when prices turned down, these investors defaulted in large numbers, contributing to the intensity of the housing cycle's downward leg. Barlevy and Fisher (2011) show that speculators are more likely to choose exotic mortgages and more likely to default. Amromin, Huang, Sialm, and Zhong (2011) find that high credit worth households chose complex mortgage products leading up to the crisis and that they were more likely to default. Garmaise (2012) shows that borrowers who chose unconventional mortgages that had back loaded payment options were more likely to default during the crisis.
Empirical evidence on the roles of homebuyer expectations and investor behavior, however, is scarce and primarily based on survey or macro-level data. A few studies have used microlevel data to show that real estate investors chase price trends, push prices away from the fundamental level, and are sensitive to negative market shocks (Fu and Qian, 2012; Fu, Qian and Yeung, 2012) . To date, no studies have explored how the default behavior of the less financially constrained homebuyers and investors contributed to the crisis. The condominium loan market is a natural setting in which to study this question. Compared to the single family loan market, a significantly higher portion of condominium borrowers are investors in our sample. There is more prevalent use of exotic mortgages in the condominium market, and it has been documented that these less conventional mortgage contracts (such as low-or no-documentation loans and option ARMs) are typically associated with higher income self-employed borrowers.
Condominium borrowers indeed have higher FICO scores and tend to purchase in more expensive areas. Therefore, the default pattern in the condominium loan market is likely to reflect the role of expectations in precipitating the crisis. Using a unique loan-level dataset for loans originated during 2003-2007, we study the behavior of loan defaults within two years of origination. We model the default behavior of the condo market relative to that of the single-family market 4 using a logistic specification with fixed effects of year of origination and state. In the pooled sample, a condo loan, on average, is as likely to default within two years of origination as a single-family loan, after controlling for other loan and borrower characteristics. However, there is a sharp increase in condo loan defaults relative to single-family loan defaults over the years-with the biggest jump in condo loan default rates in 2006 and 2007. All else being equal, a condo loan originated in 2007 is 11% more likely to default within two years of origination than a single-family loan originated in the same year.
We further study default behavior in the condominium market relative to the single- loans originated in 2007, subprime loans in the condo market default at a rate 69% higher than that of subprime loans in the single-family market. These findings imply that condo loans have distinct features that make them inherently riskier than other types of residential mortgages. 4 The single-family market in this paper refers to that of the detached single family houses.
We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the impact of condo loan defaults spills over to the single-family subprime market. Condo loans default much earlier compared with subprime loans in the single-family market; that is, there is a much higher default probability for condo loans within the first year of origination. The earlier defaults in the condo market are driven by the loans in the non-subprime sector, where there are disproportionately more investors and where borrowers take on loan terms that are much riskier than those of the single-family market. At the zip code level, we find that a higher default rate in the first year after origination among condo loans-especially this rate among loans for condo investors in the non-subprime sector-strongly predicts second-year defaults of the same cohort's single-family loans in the same zip code. Furthermore, we only find this spillover effect of within-one-year condo loan defaults in the non-judicial states. This suggests that foreclosures resulting from condo loan defaults are associated with higher subsequent defaults in the single-family subprime market, likely through the negative effect of foreclosures on neighborhood house prices (Campbell, Gilio, and Pathak, 2011) .
Two mutually non-exclusive factors could explain why we observe riskier condo loans in our sample. The underlying borrower pool in the condominium market could be riskier, or the lender could have used a more lax underwriting standard for condo loans. We use Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data to determine if lender dynamics play a significant role in explaining what we observe in the data. The HMDA data shows that across our time period, banks tended to reject more and more applications for condo loans (relative to those for singlefamily loans), a finding inconsistent with the idea that an increasingly lax screening standard led to more condo loan defaults over time. Thus, an increasingly risky condo borrower profile is a more plausible reason for the rapid increase in condo loan defaults over time.
The overall evidence in this paper points to the much ignored condominium loan market in understanding the recent financial crisis. Several studies have explored various factors in explaining the mortgage crisis, such as Keys et al. (2010a Keys et al. ( , 2010b The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we lay out the empirical methodology. In Section 3, we outline and describe the data used for this study. We present the empirical results in Section 4. Finally, we make concluding remarks in Section 5.
Methodology
Our null hypothesis is that the condo and single-family markets are similar. Hence, the default rates (as well as default growth patterns) for condo and single-family loans should be similar. We test this hypothesis to determine if condo loans have higher default rates by focusing on comparable single-family and condo markets.
Our main empirical specification is a logistic model of the default decision of loans originated between 2003 and 2007. We define a loan to be in default if it becomes delinquent by at least 60 days 5 within two years of origination. The main independent variable, Condo is , is a binary variable that is set to one if the loan is a condo mortgage. Other explanatory variables include both loan-level and macro-level variables. We include state fixed effects to control for unobservable factors at the state level, such as the cross-sectional variation in foreclosure laws.
Loan i enters the study in month t is , which is the first occurrence of that loan. The same loan exits the study in month T is , which is the earliest occurrence of one of the "exit" events (default or prepay or the end of the sample period). Finally, all the errors reported in this study are corrected for clustering at the origination year level, in addition to being robust to heteroskedasticity.
Loan-level controls are motivated by the literature. They include indicators for FICO credit scores, indicators for fixed-rate and interest-only loans, indicators for low-and nodocumentation (low/no doc) loans, an indicator for owner-occupancy status, an indicator for subprime mortgages, and an indicator for home equity lines of credit (HELOC). Following the literature, we also include an indicator variable for LTV at origination of 80% as a proxy for the existence of a second lien on the property. Continuous loan-level variables include (log of) the loan amount, the first interest rate observed, the time elapsed from origination to the end of the sample period or to the first classification as being prepaid or delinquent at least 60 days, and LTV at the time of origination. We also include the current level of the residential home price index, the state-level unemployment rate, the slope of the yield curve, and the credit spread as control variables.
Data

Data sources
5 More specifically, we define default as a loan that is delinquent by at least 60 days, or that is in foreclosure, is in bankruptcy, is REO (real estate owned), or is in the liquidation stage.
We use two main sources of data for our study: loan-level data furnished by BlackBox purchase/refinancing/home improvement), loan amount, race, sex, income, homeownership status, and also (in the case of originated loans) whether the loan was sold to the secondary market within the year. In addition, the HMDA dataset provides details on the location of the property. points). The number of subprime loans in the condo market is one-third smaller than in the single-family market. The average condo borrower's interest rate is significantly lower than that of single-family borrowers. That said, the contract terms of condo loans are less conventional than those of single-family loans. Among condo loans, we observe much fewer fixed-rate mortgages and considerably more option ARMs, interest-only loans, and low/no doc loans than in the single-family market. In addition, fewer condo borrowers purchase for owner-occupancy, and they tend to buy in more expensive areas (i.e., those with a higher FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index, or HPI).
Summary statistics: Condo versus Single-family loans
Even though condo loans are less likely to be subprime and their borrowers appear to be more creditworthy, these loans are not necessarily less risky given the higher proportion of investment-driven purchases and the greater use of non-conventional risky loan contracts. The condo market's size and fast growth during the boom in the housing market suggests that it could have played a significant role in the financial crisis.
Empirical Results
A first look at the default behavior of the condo market
The summary statistics of the full sample ( The default rates within two years of origination in both markets increased over the years in our sample (Figure 2 .1). More importantly, the increase in the condo loan default rate is much faster. Among the 2003 cohort loans, the default rate in the single-family market is more than double that of the condo market. However, among loans originated in 2007, the two-year condo default rate is 9.9%, which is comparable with 11.6% in the single-family market.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Condo loans versus subprime loans
We further compare condo loan performance for loans originated between 2003 and 2007 with that of the subprime market. To the extent that subprime mortgages are riskier loans than prime mortgages, the comparison between condo loans and subprime loans is more informative about the characteristics and risk profiles of condo loans.
Panel A of Table 2 shows the summary statistics for all condo loans and all single-family subprime loans in the pooled sample. Condo borrowers are much more creditworthy by the conventional measures. They have significantly higher FICO credit scores than single-family subprime borrowers (by 122 points), and their original LTV is, on average, 6 percentage points lower. However, close to 8% of the condo loans are option ARMs versus only 0.1% among single-family subprime loans. Additionally, 40% of the condo loans are low/no doc loans compared to 13% for single-family subprime loans. And 29% of the condo loans are interestonly loans-21 percentage points higher than the share of interest-only loans in the single-family subprime market. Furthermore, condo borrowers are much less likely to purchase for owneroccupancy than single-family subprime borrowers (69% versus 80%). Condo borrowers also purchase in more expensive areas: the average appraisal value at the time of origination is 51%
higher for condo loans than for subprime loans in the single-family market.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
We examine whether the drastic differences between condo loans and single-family subprime loans in their borrower and loan contract characteristics can be explained by a greater concentration of less conventional and riskier subprime loans within the condo market. Panel B
of Table 2 displays the borrower and loan characteristics of both condo subprime loans and single-family subprime loans. The comparisons suggest that the subprime market is relatively homogeneous across the condo and single-family markets; the differences in borrower and loan characteristics between these two markets are much smaller than between all condo loans and single-family subprime loans (Panel A of Table 2 ). Nevertheless, we still observe a robust pattern of riskier loan terms and borrower characteristics in the condo subprime market.
Figure 2.2 shows a decomposition of the default patterns in the condo and single-family markets, by subprime and non-subprime status. Within the subprime and non-subprime submarkets, condo loan defaults start at a much lower rate than single-family loan defaults, but grow more quickly over the sample period. Specifically, the rate of condo subprime loan defaults exceeds that of the single-family market by 1.9 percentage points among loans originated in 2007. These results, in combination with our previous findings, imply that condo loans have distinct features that make them riskier and more vulnerable to default, especially during times of market distress.
Empirical analysis of condo loan default behavior
Option-based theoretical and empirical models for mortgage default analysis have been well developed during the past two decades (e.g., Kau, Keenan, Muller, and Epperson, 1992; Kau and Keenan, 1999; Deng, Quigley and Van Order, 1996, 2000) , and they have increased in realism and sophistication in the past decade (e.g., Ambrose, Capone and Deng, 2001; Deng and Gabriel, 2006) . Clapp, Deng, and An (2006) provide a comprehensive review of these modeling frameworks. Following Clapp et al., we perform logistic regressions to formally study the default behavior of the condo market relative to the single-family market. Because condo loans differ substantially from single-family loans in their loan and borrower characteristics, we include observables on loan and borrower characteristics as controls in the logistic analysis. Table 3 reports odds ratios in the full sample analysis: an odds ratio greater (smaller) than one indicates a positive (negative) effect. Consistent with the literature, FICO scores, LTV, FRM loan type, and owner-occupancy status are strong predictors of default. Second lien loans and low/no doc loans are risky, as they are associated with higher default rates within two years of origination.
Although condo loans have a lower average default rate in the summary statistics (Table   1 , Panel A), the logistic analysis of Table 3 shows that after controlling for loan and borrower characteristics, condo loans do not differ much from single-family loans in their two-year default probability. Furthermore, separating default behavior by origination year reveals a significant time trend in the condo market defaults. Consistent with the time-series pattern shown in Panel B
of Table 1 [Insert Table 3 about here]
Empirical analysis of loan defaults: condo vs. subprime market
Next, we explore the dynamics of condo loan default behavior relative to subprime loan default behavior. Previous literature has documented dramatic growth in the subprime loan market during the housing boom, which played a significant role in triggering the recent financial crisis (e.g., Demyanyk and Van Hemert 2011). The condo loan market and the subprime market have similar magnitudes of growth leading up to the housing bubble burst (Figure 1 ), and we find a rapid increase in condo loan defaults in more recent vintages.
Therefore, we compare the dynamics of condo market default behavior with that of the subprime market.
First, we perform a subsample analysis of all condo loans and all single-family subprime loans. The results in Panel A of Table 4 show that, on average, condo loans are slightly more likely to default, but the effect is not statistically significant. In earlier vintages, single-family subprime loans are consistently more likely to default than condo loans of the same vintage.
However, condo loan defaults grow at a faster rate and over time condo loans begin to default more than single-family subprime loans. Condo loans originated in 2006 and 2007 are 32% and 29%, respectively, more likely to default within two years of origination than single-family subprime loans originated in those same years, conditioning on all the observed loan and borrower characteristics.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
To investigate whether the greater propensity to default among all condo loans of later origination years is driven largely by the behavior of condo subprime loans, we restrict our sample to only the subprime market (Table 4 , Panel B). In our sample, condo subprime loans are riskier than single-family subprime loans-a condo subprime loan is 9% more likely to default than a single-family subprime loan. The higher default probability among condo subprime loans is driven by the later vintages (i.e., loans originated in 2006 and 2007) . A condo subprime loan originated in 2007 is 69% more likely to default than a single-family subprime loan originated in the same year. Taken together, these findings imply that condo loans have distinct features that make them riskier than other types of loans, such as single-family loans.
The spillover effects of condo loan defaults
We document strong evidence that condo loans are inherently riskier than single-family loans. In particular, condo loans default at an astonishing rate, even compared with subprime loans in the single-family market. Does the higher risk have negative externality effects beyond its implications within the condo market? Because more condo borrowers are investors and because condo loan terms are riskier (than those of single-family loans), these borrowers are likely to be more responsive to market conditions and default on their loans earlier than other borrowers-possibly prompting more defaults in the single-family sector in the same geographic area later on.
We examine this hypothesis using two approaches. First, we directly study whether condo loan defaults are even more prominent within one year of origination. We define the oneyear default dummy as one if the loan is at least 60 days delinquent within the first year of loan origination. We compare the one-year default probability of condo loans with that of subprime loans in the single-family market (Table 5 for the 2007 cohort), this result suggests that not only do condo loans are more likely to default than single-family subprime loans, but they also default much earlier.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Within the subprime market, condo loans originated in 2007 are 44% more likely to default within one year of origination than single-family loans originated in 2007, and condo loans of the same cohort are 69% more likely to default within two years of origination (Table 4 , Panel B). This suggests that the faster rates of default among condo loans are driven more by the non-subprime sector. This is consistent with our findings ( Table 2 ) that there are more condo investors in the non-subprime sector and that condo borrowers take on riskier loan terms than single-family borrowers in both the subprime and non-subprime sectors.
Next, we look at spillover effects-whether condo loan defaults impact the single-family subprime loan market in the same zip code. We study whether more single-family subprime loans default in the second year after origination if more of the condo loans originated in the same year and in the same zip code defaulted within the first year of origination. We first regress the proportion of the second-year defaults of single-family subprime loans originated in year t in zip code j on the proportion of first-year defaults of the same-cohort single-family subprime loans and of the same-cohort condo loans in the same zip code. Other control variables include the state-level unemployment rate, the MSA-level HPI, the slope of the yield curve, and the credit spread. We also include zip code and origination year fixed effects to control for any unobservable factors at the zip code and origination-year levels. The first column of Panel A, Table 6 shows the results. A higher level of within-one-year defaults in the single-family subprime market of the same cohort does not predict more defaults in the second year after origination for the same cohort of single-family subprime loans. Although the coefficient is positive, it is statistically insignificant. However, more within-one-year defaults in the condo market of the same cohort positively predicts the second-year defaults of the same-cohort singlefamily subprime loans, and the effect is statistically significant at the 5% level.
That said, the single-family subprime within-one-year default rate is positively associated with the same-cohort condo market's second-year default rate, but its effect is much smaller than the influence of the within-one-year defaults of the same-cohort condo loans in the same zip code (column (2) of Table 6 , Panel A). The latter has a significantly higher coefficient, and the F-test rejects the hypothesis at the 1% level that the coefficient on the single-family subprime market's within-one-year default rate is equal to the coefficient on the condo market's withinone-year default rate. Results in Panel A of Table 6 are consistent with the notion that defaults in the condo market occur earlier and spill over to the single-family subprime market, but not vice versa.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
We then decompose the condo within-one-year default rate at the zip code level into the non-subprime and subprime default rates and repeat the analysis. Panel B of Table 6 shows that the positive spillover effect into the single-family subprime market arises mainly from the within-one-year defaults in the non-subprime sector of the condo market.
We also study the role of investor defaults in the condo market by decomposing the condo loan default rate at the zip code level into investor and non-investor default rates. Panel C of Table 6 shows that both investor and non-investor defaults in the first year after origination in the condo market positively predict defaults of the same-cohort single-family subprime loans in the second year after origination (column (1)). When we separate the condo within-one-year defaults by investors into the subprime and the non-subprime sectors, we find that condo investor defaults in the non-subprime sector most strongly predict second-year defaults of the samecohort single-family subprime loans (column (2)). By contrast, the coefficient on the condo investor defaults in the subprime sector is negative and statistically insignificant. Furthermore, non-subprime condo investor first-year defaults have an even higher influence than first-year non-investor condo defaults on second-year defaults in the single-family subprime market, as the F-test rejects the hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal.
Lastly, we use the exogenous variation across state laws on judicial foreclosure to better identify the spillover effect of condo market defaults. 10 Panel D of Table 6 shows the results of the single-family subprime loan second-year default regressions (as in Panel A of Table 6 ) in the judicial foreclosure states and in the non-judicial foreclosure states separately. The within-oneyear defaults in the condo market only positively and significantly predict second-year defaults among single-family subprime loans of the same origination cohort in the same zip code in the non-judicial foreclosure states. In judicial foreclosure states, foreclosures are processed through courts, which is typically a lengthy and costly process. As a result, condo defaults in these states do not immediately result in foreclosures. Because we find this default spillover only in the non-judicial foreclosure states, we infer that foreclosures following condo loan defaults are likely associated with higher subsequent defaults in the single-family subprime market through the downward pressure that condo foreclosures put on neighborhood house prices (Campbell et al., 2011) .
Overall, the results in Tables 5 and 6 are consistent with our hypothesis that condo loan defaults have an impact beyond their influence on the condo market. Condo loans in the sample default earlier than single-family subprime loans. Condo loan defaults in the first year after origination predict a higher default rate during the second year after origination of the samecohort single-family subprime loans in the same zip code. The spillover from condo loan defaults is largely driven by the mortgages of condo investors in the non-subprime market, whose early defaults could have triggered more defaults of the same-cohort single-family subprime loans in the same neighborhood through the channel of depressed local house prices after condo foreclosures.
Why do condo loans appear riskier?
Lastly, we attempt to understand why condo loans appear to be riskier than single-family loans during this period. Condominium loan borrowers might be, on average, riskier in nature than single-family borrowers (e.g., more of the condo borrowers are speculative investors), or banks might have become more lax in screening condo borrowers in the later years of the sample (relative to the single-family borrowers). We investigate these possibilities using data from the HMDA. [Insert Table 7 About Here]
Compared to our earlier BBX dataset, condo loan applications make up a much smaller fraction of the entire sample of loan applications in HMDA (<1%). This is because a potentially sizable fraction of the condo loan applications are classified into the same category as singlefamily houses in HMDA. Despite the data challenge, we are able to analyze the available condo loan applications to determine differences in the application and rejection patterns between the condo and single-family markets.
Condo loan applicants are systematically different from single-family loan applicants, indicating that we may have a selection of higher (or lower) risk borrowers in the condo market rather than in the single-family market. If the change in bank screening (especially in the later years of the sample) is driving the evolution of condo loan defaults over time, then we should observe that among loan applicants with comparable risk profiles, banks reject fewer condo loans and are increasingly less inclined to reject condo loans over time. To test this possibility, we perform one-to-one propensity score matching on the loan applications of both the condo and single-family markets in the HMDA data. The matching variables are loan amount, location (MSA), a male applicant dummy, a Hispanic applicant dummy, an Asian applicant dummy, a black applicant dummy, a second lien dummy, and an owner-occupied status dummy. Panel A of Table 7 shows summary statistics of both the matched sample and the original full sample. In the matched sample, the single-family loan applications are more comparable to the condo loan applications.
Panel B of Table 7 shows the results of the logistic analysis of loan rejections on the matched sample. Column (1) shows that, conditioning on the other loan application characteristics and fixed effects, condo loan applications in HMDA, on average, are less rejected by the banks than single-family loan applications during the full sample period (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) .
However, the growing tendency among banks to reject condo loan applications (relative to single-family loan applications) over time in HMDA appears inconsistent with the idea that an increasingly lax screening standard led to more condo loan defaults over time. In column (2) of Table 3 ), the increase in the rejection rate for condo loan applications is significantly larger than the increase in the rejection rate among single-family loan applications.
These findings suggest that an increasingly risky condo borrower profile is a more plausible reason behind the rapid increase in condo loan defaults over time.
Robustness Checks
Condo loans are systematically different from single-family loans in loan size and other observables (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). In addition, they make up a smaller portion of the mortgage market (14%) than single-family loans, resulting in an unbalanced sample in our default analysis. Therefore, we perform a propensity score match in the first stage to obtain a more homogeneous (control) sample of single-family loans. Specifically, we perform a one-toone match of the single-family and condo loans in the subprime and non-subprime markets, respectively, based on the original loan balance, location of the loan (MSA), and origination year, as well as other loan and borrower characteristics. The resulting matched sample is homogeneous in terms of loan and borrower characteristics between the condo and single-family loans, both in the full sample and in the subprime sample (see Table A1 and A2, respectively, in the Appendix). The logistic analysis both in the full sample and in the subprime sample show results broadly consistent with those in Table 3 and Table 4 .
It is well known that the subprime crisis exhibits cross-sectional heterogeneity, with a more striking default pattern in several "sand states" (i.e., California, Florida, Nevada, and Arizona). We test whether similar heterogeneity exists for condo loan defaults. In unreported analyses, we confirm that the condo loan default level and growth patterns are qualitatively the same among sand states as in the full sample. They do not appear to be stronger in these sands states, likely because there are other important determinants of condo loan presence and growth (e.g., supply constraints and demographic distribution) that make the four states a crude and noisy identification (of cross-sectional heterogeneity). Another potential sample selection bias could arise from a few super star cities whose condo markets have unique characteristics that could confound our interpretation. We perform robustness tests of our key default analysis (Table 3 and 4) by removing New York and Los Angeles from our sample. The results remain qualitatively the same. These results are available upon request.
Conclusion
Condominium loan originations grew dramatically from 2001 to 2007. We document strong evidence that condo loans are inherently riskier than single-family loans, despite many observables that make condo loans appear to be safer. More condo borrowers are investors, and their chosen loan terms are riskier than those of the average single-family borrower. Perhaps more strikingly, we find that the default rate for condo loans grows at an exponential rate over the sample period, and condo loans originated in 2006 and 2007 are considerably more likely to default, even compared to the subprime mortgages in the single-family market in the same cohort. Furthermore, we show evidence consistent with the hypothesis that condo loans default earlier and that they potentially impact single-family subprime defaults in the same geographic area. The spillover effects of condo defaults are driven by investor defaults in the non-subprime condo market, and they exist only in the non-judicial foreclosure states. This implies that condo borrowers default early, and the associated foreclosures put downward pressure on neighborhood house prices, triggering more defaults in the single-family subprime market.
Our findings have important implications for understanding the recent mortgage crisis.
The prior literature has focused on the roles of securitization and the subprime mortgage market in explaining the crisis. Undoubtedly, both of these factors played significant roles in triggering the crisis, but more fundamental factors identified by recent research, such as the role of homebuyer expectations and investor behaviors, has been largely ignored by the literature, due to lack of direct observation of such factors.
The condominium market is a natural setting to study homebuyer and investor behavior.
Condominium borrowers are more likely to be investors; they tend to be less financially constrained and have higher FICO scores (and thus higher income on average); and they tend to buy in more expensive areas. In addition, condo borrowers use much more unconventional and risky loan terms-the mortgage vehicles of choice among ruthless and strategic defaulters, according to previous studies. The average default pattern in this market is a strong indicator of the contribution of homebuyer expectations and investor behaviors to the financial crisis. Our evidence suggests that less financially constrained home buyers and investors defaulted at a greater speed when the housing market slowed down and that the large number of early condo defaults subsequently influenced default behavior in the single-family subprime market in the same zip code. comparison between all condo loans and single-family subprime loans, and Panel B presents statistics of condo subprime loans vs. those of single-family subprime loans. The variables with "D_" represent dummies. D_default within 2 yrs is equal to one for defaulting within two years of the loan origination date. Current interest rate refers to the coupon rate charged to the borrower for the most recent remittance period. Original loan balance is defined as the amount of principal on the closing date of the mortgage. FICO score refers to the FICO (formerly the Fair Isaac Corporation) borrower credit score at the time of the loan closing. Original LTV means the ratio of the original loan amount to the property value at loan origination. D_FRM is equal to one for fixed-rate mortgages. D_Owner occupied takes one if the property is owner occupied. D_Second lien is equivalent to one for a second lien loan that is subservient to the main or first mortgage on a piece of real estate. D_Option ARM is equal to one if it is an adjustable rate mortgage with added flexibility of making one of several possible payments on your mortgage every month. D_Interest only loan is one if it is a loan in which, for a set term, the borrower pays only the interest on the principal balance with the principal balance unchanged. D_Heloc is equivalent to one if it is a loan in which the lender agrees to lend a maximum amount within an agreed term, where the collateral is the borrower's equity in his/her house (HELOC is short for home equity line of credit). D_Low/No doc takes one if the borrower is required to provide low or no documentation. Margin is the difference between the interest rate charged to the borrower and the applicable ARM index, as measured in number of percentage points. Original appraisal value refers to the estimate of the property value at the time of loan origination, as supplied by the data provider. Log_HPI is log of the quarterly FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index. Note that ** and * indicate 1% and 5% significance, respectively. The dependent variable D_default within 2 yrs takes the value of one for defaulting within two years of the loan origination date. The definitions of the independent variables are shown in Table 1 . Log_Duration is the log of the elapsed time from origination to the end of the sample period or to the first classification as being prepaid or delinquent at least 60 days. The standard errors are clustered at the origination year level. State and origination year fixed effects are included in the regressions but not reported. Odds ratios are reported, and robust z-statistics are included in the parentheses. Note that ** and * indicate 1% and 5% significance, respectively.
(1) ( is defined as the proportion of single-family subprime loans (condo loans) in zip code j originated in year t that default in the first year after origination.
is the number of condo loans divided by the total number of single-family subprime and condo loans originated in year t in zip code j.
( ) is the number of condo within-one-year defaults in the subprime (non-subprime) market divided by the total number of condo loans originated in year t in zip code j.
( ) is the number of all condo owner-occupied (non-owner-occupied) loans that default in the first year after origination divided by the total number of condo loans originated in year t in zip code j.
( is the number of within-one-year condo defaults of nonowner-occupied loans in the non-subprime (subprime) market divided by the total number of condo loans originated in year t in zip code j.
( is the number of within-one-year single-family subprime defaults of non-owner-occupied (owner-occupied) loans divided by the total single-family subprime loans originated in year t in zip code j. Other unreported control variables include the state-level unemployment rate, the MSA-level HPI, the slope of the yield curve, and the credit spread. We also include zip code and origination year fixed effects in all three panels and cluster the standard errors at the origination year level. T-statistics are included in parentheses, and ** and * indicate 1% and 5% significance, respectively.
Panel A Spillover effect of condo defaults
(1) 
